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By Marcus Cunliffe 
P r o f .  M a r c u s C u n 1 i f f e, the English historian and 
biographer of Georg Washington, gave a lecture at the Otnas 
conference, where he discussed the lensions and the power 
struggle between w he generals and the politicians in  the Civil  
W a r .  This leclure is printed here for the first time. 
We cannot do without generalizations. Our minds need something 
to hang on to; and categories are easiest to  hang on to when they 
can be expressed as a dualism, a pair of opposed ideas, forces, 
tendencies. 
In historical writing, indeed in history itself, these dualisms 
abound. No-one, for example, can gain n~uch  sense of American 
history unless he sees >American> and >>Europe>> as a dualislm, and 
not merely a couple of geographical designations. *America>> and 
>>Europe> function as polarities: as opposite t e r m  in a tension 
between democracy and allistocracy, innovation and conservatism, 
the future and the past. Within the United States, ,>North, and 
  south, are likewise much more than geographical labels. They 
are resonant with argument and antagonism. They symbolize 
antipathetic attitudes. >>North>> stands for a polyglot, mobile, 
urban, inldustrial society: a ,Yankee>, society. ,South,> stands for 
a more homogeneous, static, agrarian, planter-and-slave society: 
a >>Cavalier>> society. 
On  a smaller scale, we find that in the saline way American 
military history seems to fall into a persistent dualism. On  the one 
side there is the >professional>> or *regular, principle, with the 
U. S. Military Academy at West Point as its particular symbol. 
O n  the other side there is the >,amatour>>, or ,volunteer>, or  
>,citizen>, soldlier, symbolized by the militia, and in particular by 
the ,>Minutamen>, who rushed from their ploughs to confront the 
British reldcoats at Lexington anld Concord in 1776. These tw~o 
oppos~ing principles, the professional and the amateur, have a long 
tradition of mutual hostility - and of course not only in the 
United States. The professional soldier thinks of the amateur as 
- a t  best - amateurish; and, a t  worst, as a meddler, an intriguer, 
a person who owes his place in the army to political influence. I n  
his own eyes the professional soldier is, by definition, a man above 
politics. Politics is an unsc r~~p~~ l~ous ,  civilian activity which he 
ignores and despises. I n  the words of a British general of seventy 
years go (Lord Baden-Powell, the founder of the Boy Scout 
move~ment): >,From w~hat I 1 ~ 1 1 0 ~  of hem,  I would not trust an  
ordinary politician with my grandmother's toothlrush., By contrast 
the citizen soldier, or the politican interested in military affairs, 
regards the regular soldier as - a t  best - conventional, slow- 
moving, clannish; and, at worst, as a person of inordinate vanity, 
tempted to use his momentary power or popularity to break in 
upon the civilian sphere of authority. 
Two books sium up this long-standing American rivalry, both 
written in the afterjmath of the American Civil War. One, entitled 
The Military Policy of the United States, is the work of a profes- 
sional soldier, a graduate of West Point, named Emory Upton. 
Upton's thesis is that in all Almerica's conflicts, including the Civil 
War, the professionals only just managed to avert the ruin threat- 
ened by civilian, and especially political folly. The other book, 
entitled The Volunteer Soldier of America, is by a politician-turned- 
amateur-soldier, John A. Logan. Logan's thesis is that in all Ame- 
rica's conflicts, including the Civil War, the amateurs and politicians 
only just managed to avert the ruin threatened by the incompetence 
oJf the professional sold' I lers. 
The interesting thing is that Upton's thesis has in the past ha16- 
century gained quite general acceptance among historians in the Uni- 
ted States. Textboolrs now commonly explain that in the Civil War, 
as in previous conflicts, the regular ofificers on the Norrhern (Union) 
side were bedevilled with ,>politicsn. I t  was because of political 
interference, we are told, that the much stronger Union armies 
took so long to defeat the South. Only when West Pointers were 
in control, and were trusted by Lincoln's administration, could the 
North sweep forward ~ulhindered. The Union generals, i t  must be 
confessed, often said this a t  the time. One of than,  David Huntcr, 
declared in 1564 that ,the United States governinent has nearly 
destroyed the vast resources of the people. Thousands and thousands 
of lives and millions of property have been sacrificed to the filthy 
demon of politics.,, 
The filthy demon of politics! 
One trouble with thcse dualisms - America versus Europe, North 
versus Sou&, proiessional versus politician -- is that tlrey tend to 
be seen also as a moral dualism: good versus bald, or even good 
versus evil. America thus beco~lnes the repository of virtue, and 
Europ~e of vice. Another trouble is that, for contemporaries and for 
subsequent historians, they exercise a polarizing or magnetizing 
effect. Loose evidence, like loose iron filings, is drawn into one 
corner or the other in obedience to this overs~implifying pull. So, 
in speaking of ),American and *Europe),, we have tended to 
exaggerate the ),American,> and ),European), qualities belonging res- 
pectively to the two continents, and to ignore what ),European,, 
elements actl~~ally pertain also to the United States, or what ~Aine -  
rican,, elements in fact pertain also to Europe. Similarly, we have 
tended to exaggerate the differences between North and South in 
the United States -- though of course in both cases the differences 
are real enough. 
And, to come back to my subject, soldiers and politics in the 
Ainerican Civil War, we have tended to exaggerate the differences 
between the West Point professional and the ordinary American - 
as General David Hunter did. Categories are neat; we could not 
get along without them. But history is an untidy affair, as I shall 
now illustrate in what I fear will be a most untidy discussion. 
The Union army did have legitimate grievances against politics 
and politicians in the Civil War, at  least accoriding to its own lights. 
There were the initial and continuing senior appointments dished 
out to the Bankses, the Butlers, the Schenckses, the McClernands. 
There was the prodigiiaus politiclring, at  all levels, of the (predoini- 
nantly) volunteer army: the elections within units to choose company 
officers, the power left in the hands of state governors to nominate 
field oificers, the inaneuvers of Congressinen to promote tlieir friends 
and demote their enemies. There was the constant interlerence wit11 
the forinatioils fighting near to Washington. Given the muddled 
American military heritage, a i d  his own coi~sequent unc~ertainty, 
i t  is hard not to sympathize with the Union's general in chief 
McClel~lan in 1861-62. Whatever his Eailing he behaved no worse: 
to say the least, than his predecessor Wiufield Scott might have done 
in silinilarly trying circumstances. H e  was not the first or the last 
soldier to con~plain chat the damned civilians were trying to run 
him. Those who came after, when matters were somewhat better 
regulated, still detested their proximity to Washington. John Sedg- 
wick, as a corps commanlder under General G~eorge G. Meade, 
received a letter in November 1863 froin an ol'd lady which con- 
cluded: *May God preserve you frolin all dangers in the battle 
field and in the caimp, and especially from coininanding the Army 
of the Potomac.)> Sedgwicli coinmented that from this last danger 
he was safe: BI lrnow my name has been mentioned,. . . but nothing 
could induce me to take it. Meade is twenty years older than when 
he took coimn~and.>~ 
Above all, regulars wichin reach of Washington - which in 
greater or  lesser degrees meant most of them - had cause to fear 
and loathe the activities of the Committee on the Conduct of the 
War which Congress established in December 1861. Its terms of 
reference were sweeping. Its moi&ers were not only unversed in 
military affairs: they looked with suspicion on any solldier who had 
been a t  West Point. They were the spokesmen of the extreme, radical 
wing of the Republican party; the Committee's two Democratic 
members were largely ignored. The ferocity of the radicals is dis- 
played in a typical subsequent utterance af one of the Committee, 
George W. J~dian  o i  Indiana: 
Democratic policy, in the year 1861, gave us as commanders of our 
three great military departments McClellan, Halleclr, and Buell, 
whose military administrations have so terribly cursed the country; 
while it impressed upon our volunteer forces in the field such 
officers as Fitz-John Porter, General Nelson, General Stonc, and 
very many more whose sympathies with the rebels were well known 
throughout the country.. . 
Porter and Charles Stonc were of co~urse regulars. William ())Old 
Bull))) Nelson was a for,mer naval officer - obligingly removed 
from the Coillrmittee's list by an aggrieved colnlrade who shot him 
dead in September 1862. JuEan went on: 
Of the major-and Isrigadier-generals in our armies Deinocratic policy 
has favored the Republican administration, if I am not mistaken, 
with over four-fifths, - certainly an overwhelming majority; 
while those great hives of military patronage the Adjutant-general's 
Department, the Quartermaster's Department, the Commissary 
Department, the Ordnance Department, and the Pay Department are all 
under Democratic control and have been during the war. 
Senators Benjamin F. Wade, and Zachariah Chandler, Represen- 
tative Julian and the other prime movers on the Committee, were 
supported by a good many mein~beer of Congress, by iil1flueiltial 
newspapers such as Greesley's New York Tribune and Raymond's 
New York Times, and (by a large section of the public. They 
regarded L,incoln as wealk, evasive, and lukewarin on the slavery 
issue. They convinced themselves that the army, thanks largely 
to West Point, was beset with apathy and defeafiism, and that any 
officer known to be a Democrat was p i l t y  of these sins until 
proved innocent. 
Stanton shared their creed, and gave audience to Wade and 
Chandler every day that Congress was in session. Tt was Stanton 
who clapped General Charles P. Stone under arrest, and then 
denied hiin a fair hearing, after the fiasco a t  Ball's Bluff which 
led to the establishment of the Committee. Its members, eager to 
believe the worst, decided that Stone was guilty of treasonable 
relations with the enemy, and harried an innocent man into igno- 
miny and imprisonment. Stone was released aftcr six months and 
served again, but never in positions of responsiibility. After the 
war he was almost a man without a country. His wanldenings took 
him to Egypt, where he became chief of staff of the Khedive's 
army. Pasha Stone eventually returned to the United States and 
in his closing days, with an irony that cannot have been lost on 
him, was entrusted with the construction of the padestal for the 
Statue of Liberty in New Yorik harbor. 
The Collnlnittee treated other suspect generals with the same 
scant ceremony. Witnesses appeared alone, sometrimes to find they 
were being interrogated by only one or two incmbers of the 
Committee. Relevant testimony was withheld; they did not know 
whether they were merely witnesses, or whether liilie Stone they had 
been selected as victims. A t  least, soldiers who were undcr suspicion 
of >>dislloyalty~ were handled in this fashion; the Committee imain- 
tained a dossier of the known or supposed political views of 
senior officers. I t  opposed the promotion or recommended the dis- 
missal of men who did not meet its requirements. The Comlmittee 
was by contrast h e a d y  biased in favor of >>reliable> citizen-soldiers 
such as Benjamin Butler, Lew Wallace and John C. Fritmont. I t  
encouraged officers thought to be radical in sentiment, planned 
military policy so as to push these officers forward, and thus helped 
to split the army into rival factions by setting one cominander 
against another. 
I n  vain might McClellan protest that his Domocratic leanings 
held no military significance. As the spring of 1862 approached 
without apparent signs of haste on his part, the Coinlmittee grew 
almost morbidly suspicious. His plan to withdraw from the Wash- 
ington front and advance on Richmond from the east, by way of 
the James Peninsula, struck tham as not merely weak but possibly 
treacherous. A t  their insistence Lincoln ordered McClellan to 
regrolup the twelve divisions olf the A ~ m y  of the Potomac into four 
corps under the senior division colmninanders, lrvin McDowell, S. P. 
Heintzelinan, E. V. Sumner and Erasinus Keyes. The first three 
men lmd voted against McClellan's scheme a t  a previous conference, 
while Keyes ha~d supported it only with reservations. All four, 
moreover, were considered >>radicals>>, whereas the other divisional 
commander - now to be their jluniors - were for the most part 
politically ,>conservative>>, and strong supporters of McClellan. The 
immediate defenses of Washington were placed under the collninand 
of a political appointee, Briga1dier-General James S. Wadsworth of 
New York. Another political general, Nathaniel P. Banks of 
Massachusetts, was to be entrusteid with a separate corps createld 
from the forces in the Harper's Ferry-Shenandoah Valley area. The 
radica)ls and Stanton also convinced Lincoln that McClellan had 
uilduly weakened the defensive line covering Washington. On 
their urging he decided to withhotd McDowell's corps from 
McClellan7s Peninslula expedition. It is conaeivable that the Corn- 
mittee may have had ulterior, party motives, akin to those of 
President Polk in the Mexican War. According to this theory, the 
radicals did not believe that the capital was in serious danger: they 
hopad to give ~11eir man McDowell a chance to dash forward and 
capture Richmond w l d e  McClellan was embroiled elsewhere with 
the main Confederate army. 
The Peninsula campaign proved inconclusive. The radicals then 
backed John Pope, and ensured his promotion over McClellan in 
the su imer  of 1862. The defeat a t  Second Bull Run destroyed most 
of Pope's glamor, but he was let off lightly. Popular hostil~ity was 
directed instead a t  Fitz John Porter, a warm admirer of McClellan. 
Porter, serving as a corps commander in the B d l  Run battle, was 
denounced by Pope and by McDowell (another corps commander). 
Accused of deliberately sa,botaging Pope's maneuvers, Porter was 
found guilty a t  a court-martial arranged by Stanton, and cashiered. 
This miscarriage oh justice, on a level with the deplorable treatment 
of General Stone, was not finally corrected until 1886. 
The Committee's desire for vengeance was aroused by the I'urrher 
Union defeat a t  Fredericksburg in December 1862.l Four Con~lmittee 
members descended on the camp of Pope's successor, Ambrose 
Burnside, to collect testimony. Burnside was a friend of McClellan. 
Rut he escaped their wrath by revising his opinions: he assured his 
inquisitors that far from condoning slavery he was working to end 
it. Reassured that Burnside's heart, and so presumably his head, 
was in the right place, the Committee sought another scapegoat for 
the Fredericksburg disaster. They found an acceptable victim in one 
of Burnside's generals, William B. Franklin. Though Franklin was 
more fortunate than Stone or Porter, he was nevter again given an 
important command. Once a highly regarded professional, he 
resigned from the army in despair in 1866. 
Committee members were, folloming the familiar pattern, lenient 
with General Joe Hooker, a fellow-radical; they allowed him to 
escape censure after his inglorious performance a t  Chancellorsville 
in May 1863. They were less inclined to look kindly up11 Hooker's 
I Politics of another sort may have been involved in the removal from their 
commands in November 1862 of McClellan, Porter and B u d ,  all Democrats. 
Their fall was not announced until after the mid-term Congressional elections. 
Warren G. Hassler, McClellan: Shield of the Union (Baton Rouge, 1967), 314 
-322. 
successor George Meade (a conservative). Though they could not 
demand Meaide's dismissal for his generalship at Gettysburg in July 
1863, they criticized his subsequent slowness and gradually began 
to hound him: hence the force of Sedgwick's remark that ,,Meade 
is twenty years older than when he took command.,, They were not 
sure what to make of General Grant. Then he too incurred their 
displeasure for the inconclusive and bloody Wilderness calinpaign 
of 1864, and they urged the President to ad~d Grant's name to the 
dismal roll of rejected generals. 
There co~ulld well have been a committee to investigate the conduct 
of the Committee on the Conduct of the War. O r  so some of the 
Union's luckless generals might have felt. There was some substance, 
along with exaggeration, in the comment of the London Times that 
America's Jacobins were repeating the extremist tendencies of the 
French Revolution: >,The denunaiation is precisely the same as those 
launched against the Girondins by che Mountain in the old French 
Convention. Disasters in the fielld have divided the Republican Party, 
and the zealots i m p ~ ~ t e  he reverses, not to the want of generals 
able to win victories, but to lack of faith in a principle.,, Vigilaln- 
tism was rife. But then, rhe crisis was acute; and not all the faults 
were on one side. 
This was, to reiterate, a civil1 war, with some of the elements of 
a revolution. In thle confusion, opportunities for corruption aboun- 
ded; it is hardly surprising that the venal silde of politics - brilbery, 
toadying, influence-peddling - flourished. Yet many Americans 
regarded politics in a higher spirit. I t  was one of the mechanisms 
which might enable the Union to wrest victory out of dire einer- 
gency. The New Yorher George Templeton Strong, an active inem- 
ber of the Sanitary Commission, recorded in his diary an argument 
at  the Union League Club, shortly before the 1864 presiidential 
election. The Club had drawn up a resolution that its d ~ ~ ~ t y  was to 
use its influence to promote the re-election of Lincoln. A fiew 
members objected on the ground that this would convert the Club 
into a ,,mere political machine,,. Strong explodled: 
A >,mere political machine,,, indeed! What subject of human 
thought and action is higher than politics, except only religion? 
What political issues have arisen for centuries more momentous 
than those dependent on this election? They are to determine 
the-destinies . . . of the millions and millions who are to live 
on this continent for many generations to come. 
Politics was in this sense far more than a cynical game. The 
crisis was deeper and deadlier in its divisiveness than that of the 
Mexican War. The response was inevitably more alarmist. If the 
Congressional radicals exceeded the proper limits of their authority, 
so by normal standards did the President - by expending money 
without previous sanction, by suppressing newspapers and arresting 
civilians. Accusation and counter-accusation were therefore virulent 
in the extreme. Stanton and the Committee on the Conduct of the 
War suspected McClellan of treasonable sloth: McClellan in his 
memoirs charged Stanton with ,)treasona~ble conspiracy )). 
Even for those who behaved more cool~ly, political could not be 
separated from military issues. Sholuld the war be pressed hard 
against the South? Against all parts, or against certain regions? 
Should the border states be treated gently, in order not to drive 
them into the Confederacy? What should be done about slavery, 
not merely in the aibstract but as a practical and urgent problem 
facing Union commanders? Shoiuld they respect Southern property, 
and return escaped slavers to their owners? O r  should they treat 
the runaways as ,,contraband of war), (Butler's sol~ution), or declare 
them liberated (Frlmont's view)? Should tbe aim be to reach a 
settlement with the South and seek a swift end to the fighting, or 
to shatter the slavocracy as the only sune means of reconstituting 
its social base? Should Northern morale be sustained #by the avoi- 
dance of heavy casualties, or  by waging aggressive warfare? There 
was unaniimity neither in the go.\rernnlent nor in the army on such 
thorny and fundamental questions. 
From the standpoint of energetic Union men, a number of pro- 
positions seemeed incontrovertible. The training of regular soldiers, 
in this view, made them too deliberate, too fortification-minded. 
Second, regulars were by training and association committed to 
a warped idea of the Union. The annual Boards of Visitors had 
kept on assuring the American public that West Point imbued 
cadets with a love of the Union. But a large number of West Poin- 
oers had joined the rebellion. The affection they appeared to show 
was for one another: an affection that made Northern West Pointers 
reluctant to strilke hard against their Confederate frat ern it^.^ Hence 
the recurrent rumor that such-and-such a Union general, under 
cniticism for sl~i~ggishness, had actually slipped across the lines to 
consort with the enemy colmmanlder. In the third place, i t  was 
asslumed that most Democrats were untnustworthy, anld could only 
exculpate theimselves - like Benjamin F. Butler - by displaying 
the fanaticism of the newly converted. A Democrat was a potential 
Copperhead; some Democrats, such as Marble Manton, editor of 
the New York World, were reganded as vicious traitors. I t  followed, 
fourthly, that the most dangerous of Union commanders was a West 
Point graduate who admitted to being a Democrat and who had 
close social or fam~ily ties with the Confederacy. Acconding to this 
rough yet not entirely absurd formula, several Union comlmanders 
were objects of legitimate suspicion. Don Carlos Buell, for examplie, 
was a colusin of old Daniel Twiggs, the general who surrendered 
thte Department of Texas to the Confederacy in 1861 and then 
joined the rebellion. George Meade was the brother-in-law of thc 
Confederate general Henry A. Wise, the former governor of Virginia. 
Such prejudice was not conlfined to Northern radicals. Indeed 
the very term >radical, is mislea~din~. The Committee on the Con- 
duct of the War was not the only voice of vehement Republicanism. 
Secretary af War Stanton was at least as implacable as the Com- 
mittee. Lincoln, though attacked by extreme anttislavery men as 
weak and conservative, was hilmself impatient with McClellan and 
other generals who seejmed to be dragging their feet. So was his 
Secretary of the Treas~~ry,  Salmon P. Chase, who was not much 
impressed by Stanton or Lincoln. Though the reports of the Com- 
mittee no doubt inflamed public opinion, members of the public 
such as G. T. Strong were alreaidy disposed to share their restl'ess 
inquisitorial attit~i~des. After the defeat at Fredericksburg Strong 
expressed his fear that >>Franklin and many of his brethren are, like 
the late General Fitz-John Porter, bad cases of blood poisoning and 
paralysis frolm hypertrophied McClallanism~. As late as November 
2 The Radicals would have been angered but not surprised if they could have 
reaid .tihe diary-entry for 6 May 1861 of the retired soldier Ethan Allen Hitch- 
cock: ~Matny friends urge my return to the army. But I have no heart for 
engaging in a civil w a r . .  . If fighting could preserve the Union (or restore 
it) I might conlsider what I could do to take part - but when did fighting 
make friends?, Fi f t y  Years an Camp and Field, 430. 
1864, Strong was still an enthl~~siastic admirer of Bienjamin Butler. 
Butler might not have won brilliant victories: the important thing 
was that he was a true Union man, a ,terrier), well able to deal 
with Coppherhead ,>rats>>. 
The Committee, in other words, typifkd a lairly widespread 
Northern viewpoint. To see this as a contest between Repu~blican 
zealots or intriguers and hapless West Pointers is to distort and 
oversimplify. Not all  r political^ generals were uphe1,d: t h o ~ ~ g h  t e 
loyalty of N.  P. Banllrs was not considered doubtful, he became as 
unpopular with the Committee on miltary grounds as were certain 
of the regulars. Nor were the regulars uniformly castigated. The 
Committee, in common with inany American civilians, ref~~sed to 
accept the claim that professional training was an essential pre- 
requlisite for generalship. But at various times it eagerly urged the 
claims of regulars deained to be olf the right stamp: William T. 
Rosecrans in  the West, McDoweell, Pope anid Hooker in the East. 
Possibly the regulars were contaminated by the political atmosp- 
here. One may argue that they were forced into partisanship by the 
realization that the only chance of promotion, and sometimes of 
survival, lay in a real or apparent conversion to radicalism. Simi- 
larly, one may contend that as in the Mexican War, the more pro- 
minent generals were forced into political awareness by being 
openly discussed as presidential timber. This coubd be seen as 
McCbellan's fate, when he became the somewhat reluctant Demo- 
cratic nominee in 1864. Certainly political strategists knew that any 
general who achieveld consp ic~~o~~s  success in an important command, 
especially in the East, was autmnatically entered for the presidential 
stakes. Lincoln's famous letter to Hooker oh January 1863, appoint- 
ing him commander of the Army of the Potomac, may be inter- 
preted in this light. Lincoln praised Hooker as one who did not 
>,mix politics with your  profession^. H e  went on: 
I have heard, in such a way as to believe it, of your recently 
saying that both the Army and the Government needed a Dictator. . . 
Only those generals who gain successes, can se t  up dictators. 
What 1 now ask of vou is military success, and I will risk the 
dictatorship. 
A letter full of the humorous sagacity for which Lincoln is justly 
admired.Yet it is also a sharp warning to Hooker not to meddle 
with presildent-inaliing, on the assumption that he is very likely to 
be impellcd to do so if he gains a victory. A few nloi~ths later, when 
a successor to Hooker was bcing sought, the administration may 
have been stinlulated to prefer M'eade to Jolln F. Reynolds on the 
ground that Meade, having been born abroad (his father was in the 
consular service), was thereby disqualified froin becoming a presi- 
dential possibility. In 1864 Grant was being boosted for the White 
I-louse; the New York Herald acclaimed him as &the man who 
knows how to tan leather, politicians and the hiides of rebels,,. 
According to one account Lincoln delayed naming Grant to thc 
com~mand of the Union armies until he received an assurance - via 
J. Russell Jones, the U. S. marshal in Chicago and a confidant of 
Grant's - that the general had no intention of trying for the 
presidency, despite the encouraging chorus from Democratic news- 
papers. 
Grant, and Sherman, were unusual among Union coinmanders in 
their distaste for political intrigue. This is not to say that they had 
no awareness of polli~ical nuances. Grant was after al1,only renoun- 
cing his chance of noinination for the coining election of 1864. 
The next time rotund, 1868, he was in fact the Republican candidate. 
Even in 1864 he could hardly fail to realize how inuch was a t  stake 
in Lincoln's campaign for re-election. He  and other generals 
responded readily to the adn~inistration's appeal to send soldiers 
11oine on leave to sway the vote in doubtful states. Some states 
allowed their soldiers to \rote in the field. Wether or not genlerals- 
acquiesced, there is evidence that these votes were rigged to ensure 
Republican victory. Grant despatched a telegram to Lincoln the 
day after polling to inform him that the Sixth Corps had turned 
in a Republican majority of over twenty thousand. One biographer 
of Grant, citing the telegram, adds: >,he was practically Jim Farlley.% 
Not quite; still, the point is worth making. 
Most Union gemerals, through whatever mixture of conviction and 
self-interest, displayed rather than disguised tlwir political leanings. 
Burnside, Halleck, Hooker, McClellan, Rosecrans, Shenman, Stone 
and Grant were among the regulars who had left the army before 
3 Postmaster-gencral in Franklin D. Roosevelt's cabinct, atnd a totally pro- 
fessional politican. 
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the war. Some of them - including McClellan, a railroad executive 
and a Douglas Democrat - had qluite well-defined political opinions. 
Ambrose Burnside, who resigned his commission in 1853, had run 
unuu~ceessfull~ as a Democratic candidate for Congress in Rhode 
Island before joining his frienld McGlellan in the Illinois Central. 
In  the growing sectional crisis they coulid not help but form ),views,, 
- views which as civilians they were perfectly entitled to  hold and 
express. Hooker, who also resigned in 1853, had particular reasons 
to  regard himself as a civilian. H e  had taken P~illow's side in the 
Pillow-Scott controversy during thfe Mexican War. 
When he first offered his services to the army in 1861 he was 
snubbed by the War Department. The most plausible explanation 
was that he was being victimized {by General Scott's regular subor- 
inates. A number of serving regulars held a r  developed firm 
political convictions. 
So while the Committee on the Conduct of the War may be 
blamed for forcing political abignlments upon the TJnion generals, 
i t  cannot be said that the soldiers themselves were utterly apoliticad. 
Their first appointments to the Military Acedemy were determined 
by Congressional, i. e. political, nomina.t~ions. Their places in the 
army as commissioned ofificers were often secured by lobbying 
friends in Congress. Those who gradj~~ated high an the list a t  West 
Point went into the Corps of Engineers and were ccummonly em- 
ployed on government construction schemes. Several officers actually 
wo~ked  for long periods in Washington on these semi-civilian tasks, 
and developed close links with Senators and Representatives. During 
the Civil War they bombarded Congressmen and the Administration 
with requests for proimotion, for leave, for special consideration 
of every kind. 
As we have noted, McDowell, Pope, Hooker, David Hunter and 
others declared themselves to bqe radical. McClellan insisted in his 
memoirs that he was innocent of political ambibion. N o  doubt this 
was true at the outset. Yet despite himself he followed the path of 
Winfield Scott. H e  was a hero; he began to believe what he was told 
be his admirers, or by people who shared his resentment at the Re- 
pvblican adn~inistration - that he was agenius whose country need- 
ed him a t  the head of its colunsels. Once he was sufficiently famous 
he was automatically a candifdate for the presidency. As with Scott, 
his very fall fro111 favor not only spurred his ambition and rancor 
but also made him the more attractive to the opposition party. 
The most balanoed assessment of the situation is that of the 
situation is that Jaaob Dolson Cox. This Ohio politician, who 
became a major-general an.d a corps commander, was a former briga- 
dier-general af militia. Though he hajd never worn uniform in 
peacetime he claims to have long been interested in tactics and 
strategy. The vohunteer battalions had, he concedes, many defects; 
they often went wrong, for example, in their initial choice of affi- 
cers. But the worst errors were remedied, and the mass of young 
volunteer officers showed both ability and adaptability. As for 
the so-called >political generals,, he wisely reinanks: 
In an armed struggle which grew out of a great political 
contest, it was inevitable that eager political partisans 
should be among the most active in the new volunteer 
organizations. They called meetings, addressed the people 
to arouse their enthusiasm, urged enlistments, and often set 
the example by enrolling their own names first. . . It was a 
foregone conclusion that popular leaders of all grades must largely 
officer the new troops.. . It was the application of the old Yankee 
story, ,,If the Lord will have a church in Paxton, he must tabe sech us 
ther' be for deacons. 
Cox admits that in a sense >,the whole organization of the 
voluntjeer forae might be said to be political,>> but that *we heard 
more of 'political generals' than we did of political captains or  
lieutenants>>. The inifusion of politics a t  all levels, from the narrow 
matter of party patronage to  the broadest and highest matters of 
Union policy, was thus not merely inemitall3le but ev'en desirable. 
On  the question of patronage appointments, the West Point 
complaint was that senior commands were entrusted to men of no  
military talent, soline of whom had got in by the door mar~ked 
>>push>> and some by the door manked  pull^. Could anything be 
said in praise of a Banks or  a Butler, a McClernand, a Daniel Sick- 
les, a Franz Sigel, or  (on the Confederate side) a Gideon Pillow, 
a Hotell Cobb or a Felix Zollicaffer? The most olbvious answer is 
that Lincoln (and Davis, to a lesser extent) were obliged to appoint 
such men, or to accept them on pressing recommendation. There 
were not enough West Pointers to go round. Lincoln needed Sigel 
because Sigel was German-born and a leader in  the St Louis com- 
munity. As such he was a valuable bellwether for German-Ameri- 
cans: ,,I fights mit S ige l~  was said to be their slogan. Moreover, 
Sigel was a graduate of a military academy and had served in the 
German army. H e  had been active in the militia since he arrived 
in the United States. I t  was reasonable until events proved other- 
wise to assume that Sigel might be another Steuben or  de Kalb. 
Benjamin Butler's pre-war militia experience, his energy and con- 
fidence, and his standing as a War Democrat, made him too 
important to be brushed asilde. Banks, a former Congressman and 
governor of Massachusetts, sounded like a politico anid had a 
solmewhat unimpressive war record, culminating in his resignation 
after the Rod River fiasco in 1864. But he was a man of courage 
who held a series of thankless commands, and who had some 
grounds (like General John A. Logan, the former Democratic 
Congressman from llli~nois) for believing that he was discriminated 
against by a West Point coterie. James S. Wadsworth was a radical 
Republican who interrupted his military service to run unsuccess- 
fully for che governorship of New York: he was also a gallant 
leader who returned to the army, con~manded a division a t  Chaw 
cellorsville and Gettysiburg, and was mortally wounded in thc 
Wilderness in 1864. The overriding fact, as Butler and Logan were 
to insist in later years, was that long before the end of the war 
every important coininand was in the hands of a regular soldier. 
The most that >>political,> o r  ~civi l ianr  soldiers could hope for was 
a subordinate role, or command of an unpromising sideshow like 
the Red River campaign. I n  other words, the professionals had no 
more reason to camplain of this political feature of the war than 
of radical efforts to determine strategy. 
The Co~mmittee on the Conduct of the War did behave arbitrarily. 
But insofar as there w a s  a ,West Point mentality,, the Committee 
and its supporters were not entirely wrong to equate this with 
sliuggishness. Though the wrong men - Buell, Porter - may have 
been hounded, there was a case for punishing a few commanders 
pour encourager lcs autres. Insofar as the West Pointers shareld the 
same uncertainties and prejudices - including political ones - as 
the rest of their countrymen, the Committee was not entirely wrong 
in treating them accordingly. 
While there was therefore a klind of esprit du corps among 
regulars, before and during the Civil War, its effects were limited. 
The professionals sometimes thought of themselves as an entity when 
they wene threatened as an entity by outsiders, or believed they 
were. Their chief complaint was against politics and politicians 
because these were convenient shorthand terms. >Politics>, covered 
a multitude of actual or fancied forms of neglect, ingratitude, 
injustice, disappoinmnent. Like soldiers in other armies, who have 
l~ooked forward to peacetime ,,in order to get back to real soldlie- 
ring,,, they attributjed to the military sphere evferything that was 
sitmple, clear, honest and heroic, and to the political sphere every- 
thing that was tangled, discordant, frustrating and treacherous. 
They were in fact, of course, far from united on most issues. In 
the Civil War the Union seemed at moments to be more at war 
with itsdf than with the Confederacy. They bickered over minor 
points, they split wide apart on the major issues of the war. Thelir 
factious quarrels spilled out in courts of inquiry, courts martial 
and even occasional duels. They were following the confused 
tradition of American civil-military relations. 
The regular officers were then not a caste apart, absorbed in 
their craft and unaware o~f political contexts. I t  must be added 
though that their behavior was as a whole healthily strident. As a 
series of articles in the Army & Navy Chronicle of 1836-37 had 
revealed, there were a t  last two sides to the prolblein of the involve- 
ment of soldiers in politics. The pure, apollitical professional was apt 
to be too much cut off from thc life of his country. H e  could 
degenerate into the outlook of a mercenary. Or, throiugh disdain 
and conceit, he could conceive of himself as a privileged and power- 
ful janissary. At the other extreme, the too-thoroughly civilianized 
soldier was equally dangerous: non-military factors played too large 
a part in his thinking. 
Both of these extreme tendencies could be seen in other countries. 
The United States has not had >>men on horseback, though it has 
had a number o~f generals in the White House. Among presidential 
aspirants, only the semi-civilian soldiers have carried the day. Those 
with vainglorious, proconsular temperaments have failed to satisfy 
the electorate. The public has, to use a distinction drawn by Arthur 
Schlesinger Jr., preferred the >,Ikes,, to the ),Mats, - Taylor to 
Scott, Grant to McClellan. Bearing in mind the deficiencies of 
Scott and McClellan, we may be glad that Democratic intrigue 
ruined the chances of the one, and Republican intri~gue the chances 
s f  the other. If Polk and Lincoln, and their henchmen, had actod 
with high-minded generosity toward these contenders, it is conceiv- 
able that both miight have gaiiled the presidency. I t  is almost 
certain that they woluld have made bad presi~dents. I t  is however 
also almost certain that neith'er would have ind~~ilged his grandiose 
egotism to the extent of subverting the Constitution. Though their 
heads were turned by ambition anid flattery, they were still sane. 
In the 1860s there was a great deal of talk in the North, among 
soldiers and civilians alike, sf the need for a stronlg man, a leader, 
a Cromwell, to save the Union. The need remained a matter of talk. 
None of the putative Napoleons took any positive step to assume 
control. When challenged the men on horsebaok were quick to 
dismount. There was no real threat of a coup d'etat. None went 
even as far toward power as France's abortive hero olf the 1870s, 
General Bodanger. 
Nleither before nor during Civil1 War did America solve the pro- 
blem olf how to steer neatly between the extremes of civilianness 
and inillitarisin. But then, no other country has discovered the 
exact range of appropriate compromises. This is a problem without 
a perfect solution. The American answer leaned toward civilianness. 
In the words of >>Alcibiades>>, writing in the Army & Navy 
Chronicle in January 1836: 
If a military officer feels no interest in the important 
political struggles of the day, . . . he acknowledges himself 
at once to be.  . a hireling. . . who would serve the Russian 
Autocrat, the British King, or even Louis Philippe, provided 
the pay and rank were sufficient temptation. 
Nearly every officer of any distinction, at the commence- 
ment of the American Revolution, was a politician. . . Politics 
filled our early councils with those who had.  . . wielded the 
sword against the enemi~es of liberty. . . Look to the late war 
with England! Were not many of the most distinguished officers 
of that period politicians, most of whom still live to prove the 
truth of the assertion? 
The West Pointers were pro\fessional to the extent that they 
thought themselves better than amateurs, and gave preference to 
their own kind where they had the opportunity, as Sherman did in 
picking 0. 0. Howard rather than John A. L,ogan to command 
the Army of the Tennessee after the death in action of James B. 
McPherson. Otherwise they were quite d e ~ p l y  immersed in civilian- 
ness. Iff they had not been, perhaps dewler would have abandoned 
the Union and gone over to the Confoderacy. But their critics were 
Inconsistent in reproaching them silnultaneously for being an aristo- 
cratic coterie and for responding so representatively to the emotions 
that swayed their fellow-countrymen. Many of the professional 
politicians were amateur soldiers. Many of the professional soldiers 
were almateur politicians. The interfusion made things chaotic: it 
helped to prevent them from becoming catastrophic. 
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